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Abstract. One of the main characteristics of the contemporary aesthetic debate is the 
recovery of the concept of mimesis, as a dimension that is originally involved in the 
foundation of human culture and the processes of cultural learning. This is evident in 
the aesthetic reflection developed by Gunter Gebauer and Christoph Wulf. For these 
two authors, mimesis is never a mere reproduction of the given reality, but always 
implies the production of the New, of the Other, of the different with respect to the 
empirical world, i.e. to the existing categorical order of the world. In particular, Gebau-
er and Wulf underline the constitutive ambivalence of the notion of mimesis: on the 
one hand, it favors the processes of reification fueled by capitalist society and, on the 
other hand, it contributes to the affirmation of a critical and “utopian” instance that 
can counter “instrumental reason” and the primacy of identity.
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1. MIMESIS IN ANTHROPOGENESIS: CULTURE, GAMES, RITUAL
In a world characterised by the dissolution of all traditionally nor-
mative aesthetic paradigms, and by the tendential juxtaposition or 
overlapping of new heterogeneous and mutually conflictual paradigms, 
the philosophical research of Christoph Wulf and Gunter Gebauer, 
through its original historical-anthropological approach, can be cred-
ited with having reaffirmed the crucial importance of the concept of 
mimesis, mostly over the past thirty years, by supplying the investiga-
tion about it with fertile new trans-disciplinary theoretical foundations. 
This has allowed the notion of mimesis, which has always constituted 
one of the cornerstones of Western culture1, to undergo a profound 
conceptual redefinition that is both theoretical and historical2.
1 See Mattioli [1993]; Halliwell [2002]; Desideri, Talon-Hugon [2017].
2 See Fischer, Perret [1998]; Jeffrey [2011].
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Wulf and Gebauer argue that mimesis «plays 
a role in nearly all domains of human action, 
representation, speech and thought», as it is «an 
essential condition of social life» (Wulf [1995]: 9): 
every possible act of writing or reading – every 
linguistic act or intellectual process –  is found-
ed on a mimetic practice. Their starting point is 
that, taken alone, the empirical world is nothing, 
that is to say, nothing that is “already-given”. To 
understand the world means establishing relation-
ships between different worlds that are primarily 
mimetic. Thus our understanding of the world is 
always an understanding of multiple relationships, 
both of a theoretical and a practical order, that are 
established between heterogeneous worlds, each of 
which acquires meaning and clarity only in rela-
tion to the others.
Mimesis presents itself to us as the foundation 
of processes of socialisation, civilisation and the 
construction of thought. It appears as a decisive 
instance capable of rendering an account of modes 
and forms in which our collective life is histori-
cally realised, but also of all of those actions, prac-
tices, and symbolic-cognitive strategies through 
which the processes of the elaboration and inter-
subjective organisation of sense are always and 
again renewed. Thus mimesis is to be understood 
as an original principle capable of in some way 
rendering an account, in historical-anthropologi-
cal terms, of the very genesis of culture, as well as 
of the various modes of its effective transmission, 
reception, and dissemination (cf. Jeffrey [2011]).
Wulf and Gebauer start from the assump-
tion that mimesis cannot be reduced in any way 
to a mere practice that reproduces what exists. 
The idea of mimesis, that is, cannot be naively and 
banally reduced to Nachahmung, which holds that 
the imitative act consists in the pure and simple 
repetition of a pre-existing model, whether exter-
nal or internal to the mind of the subject that 
imitates. On the contrary, the notion of mimesis 
simultaneously holds in itself a vast multiplicity of 
meanings, valences, and semantic connotations. 
Upon the idea of imitation as nachahmen (as pro-
duction of an image-copy or Abbild) are superim-
posed ideas such as «bringing to representation» 
(Darstellung), «emulation», «becoming similar», 
«miming» in the sense of bodily-performance and 
gesture, «simulating», «expressing» and «mimeti-
cally anticipating» (vor-ahmen).
Far from supplying a definition that is meta-
historical and normative, Wulf and Gebauer 
emphasise that the concept of mimesis cannot be 
determined once and for all, since it escapes any 
systematic, totalizing and all-encompassing effort. 
For them, mimesis is not an univocal and homo-
geneous notion, but is one that, in Aristotelian 
terms, pollachòs lèghetai, «can be said in many dif-
ferent ways». Moreover, one of the distinctive fea-
tures of the notion of mimesis advanced by Wulf 
and Gebauer is the fact that it never results in a 
simple reference to something that is already-giv-
en and already-structured, that is, to something 
whose mimetic image would constitute a simple 
doubling or mirroring (according to a semiotic 
and denotative paradigm). Rather mimesis creates 
the qualitatively “new”, in the sense that it produc-
es difference, alterity, and the non-identical with 
respect to the existing categorical order of the 
world, and therefore with respect to the forms that 
already effectively obtain within a given empirical 
reality.
In this perspective, the surprising cogni-
tive and inventive power of mimesis consists in 
its capacity to create something «original» (Wulf 
[1995]: 11), that is, something that «cannot be 
explained with reference to something given» 
(ibid.). What is produced is an unexpected and 
nondeterminate horizon of possible meanings 
that was not there before. Understood in this 
way, mimesis is always the carrier of a «surplus of 
sense» (cf. Wulf [2014]) that cannot be precise-
ly foreseen, and that attests to the lack of rigid-
ity of the life of culture: the non-calculability of 
its incessant transformations. Thus the surplus of 
sense that qualifies every mimetic practice can be 
understood as an «anthropological constant» and 
it is exemplary of the «eccentric» character of the 
human condition, i.e. of its constitutive incom-
pleteness, and therefore of the possibility of con-
tinually renegotiating its relationship with the 
world in new ways.
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From the historical-anthropological perspec-
tive of Gebauer and Wulf, mimesis and ritual-
ity are intimately connected dimensions (cf. Wulf 
[2003]; [2004], [2005], [2014b]). Every symbolic 
and cognitive practice takes on a ritual form, 
which always implies processes of inclusion and 
exclusion, i.e. acts of differentiation. And at the 
base of this ritual a mimetic process is always 
discernable. Mimesis is involved in every process 
concerned with the formation of our social identi-
ty, every process concerning self-representation or 
self-presentation that is carried out within a social 
and communitarian horizon, and every process of 
sense production and of the shared participation 
of such sense.
From this point of view, mimesis can be under-
stood as a partial exemption (Entlastung) from 
an otherwise pervasive sense of fragility and 
insufficiency, i.e. as a compensatory and adap-
tive strategy able to defend and protect us from 
the non-sense of reality. In other words, mimesis 
constitutes a necessary but always contingent and 
revocable remedy against the sense of finitude and 
narrowness that weighs upon us. Hence Gebauer 
and Wulf ’s claim that «mimesis is an integral and 
constitutive part of anthropogenesis» (Gebauer, 
Wulf [2003]: 29): «it is a conditio humana; with-
out mimetic capabilities, man could not become 
what he has over the long history of phylogenesis» 
(Gebauer, Wulf [2003]: 31). Unsurprisingly, «at the 
beginning of ontogenesis, the first images, sounds, 
and bodily reactions are adopted and re-elaborat-
ed mimetically through instincts, without being 
channeled through a controlled conduit» (Gebau-
er, Wulf [2003]: 31).
Thus, prompted by feelings of terror and anxi-
ety in the face of the «absolutism of reality» (Blu-
menberg), it is precisely to guarantee their surviv-
al in a hostile natural environment that primitive 
humans initially attempted to escape this fear by 
carrying out procedures of a mimetic nature. This 
consisted in their adaptation to, and assimilation 
with, the external environment, with the aim of 
rendering themselves indistinguishable from, and 
on a par with, plants and animals. In this sense, 
mimesis (understood as mimicry) constitutes a 
strategy for self-preservation, but one that results 
in the rigidity and alienation of the human being. 
At work here is what Freud called the «death 
drive», understood as a drive to restore a previ-
ous state, «repeating it» (and this occurs mimeti-
cally), with the goal of re-establishing a tensionless 
condition that – precisely in its lack of tension – is 
experienced by the subject as «pleasing».
Nonetheless, even at this level mimesis puts 
into play an element of difference, even as it pro-
duces assimilation (and therefore identification) 
with something outside the self. Mimesis means 
that the human being does not dissolve without 
residuals in nature, but that it has set itself up 
alongside nature as something different, as a Self 
that attempts to assert and legitimate itself. Hence 
in the “pre-civilised” phase of human evolution, 
human beings “formed” themselves by giving 
themselves over to the external environment and 
subjecting themselves in some way to its unspeak-
able and threatening power, perceived by humans 
as an expression of unassimilable otherness, of 
unsettling strangeness. This implies, however, the 
permanent risk of self-dissolution and of collapse 
into the heterogeneous.
In a later stage, a mimetic practice is estab-
lished that is based on the use of rationality. Here 
reason figures as a faculty oriented towards the 
pursuit of control – its primary adaptive scope 
– and dominion, which is exercised by the sub-
ject over nature. In this phase, now fully “histori-
cal”, the subject is no longer placed in a relation 
of equivalence to the object (to external nature), 
i.e. in a relation of “organic” and “sympathetic” 
attachment to the Other,  but tends to exercise its 
own power over the world. As is already the case 
in the mythical-prehistoric phase, mimesis here 
is inextricably related to an instance of domina-
tion: a dominion which, in an earlier historical-
cultural phase, already manifested itself in the 
emergence of magical thought, and in its attempt 
to “influence” nature through effective represen-
tations, symbolic practices and mimetic anticipa-
tions (i.e. through practices capable of producing 
“effects” on things by grasping the relationships of 
contiguity, similarity and contrast between them). 
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Nevertheless, the archaic subjection of the subject 
to nature is now replaced by the subject’s submis-
sion to the “new” mythical power of instrumental 
reason that is busy in its “enlightened” work of 
building civilization: what becomes theoretically 
essential to the subject is its attempt to reduce the 
chaotic multiplicity of the empirical world to the 
abstract unity of the concept.
Thus the supremacy of the abstract over the 
concrete in human life replaced the dominion 
that nature had held over human beings, implying 
the dominion of the human as a subject over the 
human now reduced to an object. And so abstrac-
tion exercises its identitarian coercion on empiri-
cal experience. All of this entailed a “sacrifice”, not 
the sacrifice demanded by ancient magical prac-
tices, but rather the sacrifice of sensibility, that 
vital dimension of the subject that is one with cor-
poreality. What is sacrificed is the “vital” affinity 
between man and nature i.e. the fluidity and inde-
terminacy of our original “commerce” with the 
world. Thus the dominion of the Self over nature 
translates into a repression of the sensible by the 
intelligible, of the concrete by the abstract, of the 
intuition by the concept.
And thus the constitutive ambivalence of 
mimesis comes into view: on the one hand, it con-
stitutes the initial moment of the process whereby 
instrumental rationality is asserted, which leads 
man to achieve full dominion over nature (with 
all of the consequences mentioned above); on the 
other hand, as an expression of an ineradicable 
relationship with the sphere of corporeality and 
the vitality of nature, it appears as a productive 
and creative dimension that is capable of resist-
ing the triumph of instrumental rationality, and 
therefore the triumph of abstraction and reifica-
tion. Indeed, mimesis originally holds this capac-
ity to refer to the indeterminateness, non-defina-
bility, and non-explicability of nature, which, as 
Wulf writes, «offers to man the possibility of a 
vital experience» (Wulf [1998]: 162). Mimesis is 
therefore capable of certifying the need for a ref-
erence to something that transcends the identical, 
the “given”. It is, in other words, an affirmation of 
the possible existence of an “other” dimension, i.e. 
of an ulteriority (an “excess”), that the subject can-
not control and that escapes their logical-rational 
dominion. In so far as it is an expression of empa-
thetic behavior – a tendency to valorize the other-
ness of the object, for the object to assimilate the 
subject – mimesis enters into a dynamic and ten-
sional relation with the violence of demonstrative 
thought that is founded on the rigid opposition 
between subject and object, and which then tends 
to integrate every difference into its own categori-
cal order. 
2. BETWEEN REPETITION AND DIFFERENCE, 
RULES AND INNOVATION, GIVENNESS AND 
POSSIBILITY
Gebauer and Wulf state that mimesis implies 
an instance together assimilative and differenti-
ating. On the one hand, it mirrors and repeats 
pre-existing socio-cultural models, an action that 
gives rise to a tendential identification with the 
already-given. On the other hand, it implies a 
space for freedom, creativity, and innovation, to 
which is owed the virtually unlimited expansion 
of our perceptive, imaginative, symbolic and cog-
nitive horizon. While a given community estab-
lishes and perpetuates itself through the mimetic 
dimension of ritual action, securing for itself con-
tinuity over time, the very same mimetic action 
simultaneously produces an experience of discon-
tinuity, consisting in the creation of the new. Thus 
it might be said that mimesis takes part in both 
«the improvement and the “non-improvability” of 
man» (Gebauer, Wulf [2003]: 35).
Moreover, if mimetic and ritual processes of 
social construction are always the expression of 
the grammar of the “interactive” and dynamic 
body – a grammar in movement – there is the 
continual implementation, absorption and trans-
mission of an eminently practical and performative 
knowledge at the root of such rituals3. This knowl-
3 On the centrality of the «performative dimension» for 
understanding the ritual processes underlying the «gen-
esis of the social», see in particular Gebauer, Wulf [1998] 
and Wulf, Zirfas (ed.) [2004]: 7-45.
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edge can be understood as a complex network of 
similarities and differences – in Wittgensteinian 
sense of «family similarities», according to Wulf ’s 
interpretation of the «genesis of the social» (Wulf 
[2005]: 9; 74) –, a network in which the repetition 
of the “same” is always productively connected to 
the creation of the “new”. The manifestation of this 
knowledge takes the form of a “staging” or “game”, 
understood – again in a Wittgensteinian sense – 
as the indissoluble union (a short-circuit) between 
“rules” and “innovation”, between necessity and 
freedom, between necessity and contingency. The 
very notion of a “game” implies a practice that is 
structured by rules, but which cannot be reduced 
entirely to those rules in a deterministic way. This 
is because the application of the “general” rule 
to the “particular” case is not itself structured by 
rules – something that would require an infinite 
regress – but requires a creative, constructive, and 
“meta-operative” capacity, and as such one that is 
not determined by the valid a priori “legality” of 
concepts (cf. Garroni [2010]).
The learning expressed by mimesis is elastic 
and flexible, and as such is infinitely malleable. It 
is historically conditioned, and precisely as such, 
is always open to additions, re-elaborations and 
transformations that can be mutually contradic-
tory and conflictual. This guarantees the continual 
emergence of difference within the very identity of 
the symbolic-operative model that is repeated and 
reproduced through learning and memorisation. 
Thus, it is through the inseparable connection of 
repetition and difference – of stability and modi-
fication – that the processes of the acquisition and 
renewal of our cultural inheritance, understood 
as an intangible patrimony of forms and learn-
ings, can develop concretely. And this allows for 
the enrichment and expansion of our imagina-
tion, and with it our vision of the world, which 
becomes increasingly complex, dense and articu-
lated. Thus a close connection between mime-
sis and imagination is established: in virtue of its 
character as both reproductive and productive, 
imagination is able to institute new «relations of 
sense» between things, on the base of a «ludic» 
and «associative» dynamic able to connect pres-
ence and absence, visible and invisible, past and 
future (cf. Wulf [2014]: 10-14).
The kind of learning and knowledge connect-
ed with mimesis, being necessarily conditioned 
by the variability and irreducible singularity of 
the ways in which it is enacted, escapes any defi-
nition that claims to be exhaustive, univocal, and 
totalising. This means that the practical knowl-
edge set in motion by mimesis exceeds the sphere 
of theorèin, thereby eluding any possible attempt 
to render an account of such knowledge in ana-
lytical terms through classifications and logical-
conceptual explanations. And so mimesis, play and 
ritual exclude any determinism and any herme-
neutical reductionism. Ritual and mimetic prac-
tices, while necessarily presupposing a system of 
pre-structured rules, codes, and conventions, are 
never conceivable as the mere reproduction of 
schemas that are immutable and so not subject 
to temporality. On the contrary, it is always and 
only through time, and thus in the horizon of 
becoming, that we mimetically learn and apply the 
rules of various games –  games in which we are 
immersed and involved chiefly on an emotive and 
affective level. We perform these rules time and 
again, ceaselessly modifying and modeling them.
Hence mimesis’ capacity to expand and restruc-
ture our concept of reality, as well as that of expe-
rience – understood as the mobile and variable 
horizon of our understanding, i.e. of the way in 
which we represent the world to ourselves – that is, 
time and again, dominant. This is due to the fact 
that «in the mimetic appropriation of the given, 
the imaginative faculty of the recipient informs 
the imitative process such that the given acquires 
a new quality for the person who imitates» (Wulf 
[1995]: 11). This production of the “qualitatively 
new” is a consequence of the fact that the mimet-
ic act always implies the enactment of procedures 
that transform the given, through integrations and 
omissions, additions, accumulations, and subtrac-
tions. These are all elements that make mimesis 
something far from obvious and simple, both from 
an aesthetic and an epistemological point of view.
Mimesis proceeds by way of exclusions and 
inclusions, assimilations, incorporations and read-
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justments, simultaneously: in imitating, the sub-
ject adds something to the imitated object that 
is irreducibly their own. This takes place within 
a very complex dynamic that is marked by – and 
productively permeated by – tensions, distor-
tions, errors, partial misunderstandings, inaccu-
racies and imprecisions. To imitate is therefore 
to attempt to render one’s own something that is 
extraneous, but without ever succeeding in this 
attempt. In fact, what is imitated is never some-
thing perfectly transparent, but is instead complex 
and irretrievably “opaque”.
From this point of view, the mimetic act 
appears as something eminently hermeneutic, 
inasmuch as it is the expression of an interpretive 
process that puts into play an indefinite multiplic-
ity of meanings and historical-cultural contents, 
as well as emotions, moods, sensations, hopes, 
desires, promises, expectations and intentions, 
more or less hidden and more or less capable of 
being made explicit. What is exhibited and pro-
duced by mimetic practices is therefore a type of 
knowledge founded in the first instance on ais-
thesis, on the pragmatic and performative con-
creteness of experience, i.e. on the “aesthetic” 
dimension of feeling as a dimension that pre-
cedes the “logical-conceptual” instance of intel-
lection. As Wulf affirms: «Mimetic learning is a 
sensory, body-based form of learning in which 
images, schemas and movements needed to per-
form actions are learned» (Wulf [2017]: 8). Mime-
sis therefore is to be understood as a process of 
incorporating “imprints” and “frames” – social, 
cultural, historical and symbolic materials, as well 
as behavioral patterns – that the subject “recipi-
ent” transforms through the transcending and 
innovative power of their imagination. It is a pro-
cess of making sense that expands and renews our 
life-worlds in order to create new ways of experi-
encing and acting. 
The notion of mimesis contains within it both 
the imitated object and the subject that imitates, 
both the final result of the imitative process and 
the imitative process as such, together with all the 
possibilities of change and re-configuration of the 
imitated reality that it implies. Thus mimesis «is 
not» only «oriented towards what is behind» it, 
not only aimed at the pre-constituted givenness of 
the model that it is called to represent, but «looks 
ahead», pointing towards the «not-yet-created» 
(Wulf [1995]: 11-12). It aims at the “non-existent”, 
at the other of the given, i.e. the “possible” that is 
not yet realised but which has only been imagined 
or is only imaginable in the concrete changes of the 
effective situations in which the subject is engaged.
In this perspective, the mimetic act can be well 
understood only if it is seen in light of the com-
plexity and richness of its implications. More in 
detail, the two authors explain the mimetic act 
by connecting it to some essential anthropologi-
cal and evolutionary characteristics of humanity: 
their constitutive dependence upon learning; their 
residual instinctual endowments; their adaptive 
nature; and the hiatus that always exists between 
the perceptive stimulus and the subject’s response. 
In the explication of the mimetic function, it is 
therefore necessary to consider the close inter-
connection between imagination, language, and 
corporality, as well as between theory and praxis, 
and thus between subject and object or ego and 
world. In this sense, as much as the human aspires 
to identify an original model to employ as prius 
(i.e. as a foundation of mimetic representation), 
mimesis always reflects a reality that is already 
constructed, or rather already symbolically mediat-
ed, and not something that is originally pure and 
ontologically neutral.
3. BETWEEN REIFICATION AND OPPOSITION, 
BETWEEN IMPLOSION OF DIFFERENCE AND 
UTOPIA
It is in light of these preliminary considera-
tions that in particular Wulf reconstructs  the his-
torical development of the idea of mimesis. In 
his volume Mimesis (Wulf [1995]), which could 
be understood as a synthetic review of his more 
extensive research project on this topic carried 
out with Gebauer (cf. Gebauer, Wulf [1992]), he 
shows the various changes of paradigm that char-
acterised this notion: from the ancient poetics to 
199Ambivalence of the Notion of “Mimesis”: Between the Opening towards the Other and the Repetition of the Same
the Critical Theory of Theodor W. Adorno; from 
Plato and Aristotle to the reflection on the nexus 
between mimesis and violence proposed by René 
Girard; and from the mythical-archaic forms of 
“magical thought” to the modern “civilisation of 
simulacra” theorised by Baudrillard. His enlight-
ening analysis confirms at every step the idea of a 
constitutive plurivocity of the notion being exam-
ined, underscoring its always historically condi-
tioned character.
But beyond the remarkable observations that 
Wulf makes regarding the history of the idea 
of mimesis in Western culture, he also makes a 
notoeworthy contribution concerning the con-
vergence between social mimesis and aesthetic 
mimesis, which has profound relevance to current 
philosophical debates. It is in his discussion of 
this subject, in the third chapter, that Wulf offers 
a renewed understanding of the concept of mime-
sis in light of some of the most urgent problems 
in the contemporary debate concerning image 
and representation. These include: the relationship 
between art and reality, or art and life; the theme 
of the reification of experience and of the homolo-
gation of sense within the modern “society of the 
spectacle” (a society of triumphant globalisation 
in which the characteristics of the “culture indus-
try”, in Horkheimer and Adorno’s sense, are radi-
calised); and the question of the political nature of 
the image, with reference to the possible utopian 
and critical function –  i.e. the function of “resist-
ance” –  that it might perform within postmodern 
and post-industrial civilisation.
The central point raised by Wulf is that in 
the contemporary world mimesis is characterised 
first and foremost by its structural ambiguity and 
ambivalence. If, on the one hand, it seems com-
plicit in the processes of the homogenisation of 
sense, that is, of its contraction, leveling and can-
alisation, processes which are typical of the glo-
balized world, on the other hand, it contains with-
in itself the capacity to present an alternative to 
these very same processes, and thereby to offer an 
instance that is at once critical and utopian. Let us 
analyse the first of these two possible dimensions 
implicit in the idea of mimesis.
The “reifying” feature of mimesis is a conse-
quence of the eminently adaptive nature of the 
mimetic act. In this way, Wulf argues, mimesis 
«contributes, through adaptation to the devastated 
environment, to the hardened social structures 
and relationships of domination, to the coercion 
of chronocracy and the mechanical logic of self-
referential processes, to reification and estrange-
ment» (Wulf [1995]: 70). Wulf ’s conclusion here 
is clear: in a constitutive sense mimesis contains 
instances both of passive adaptation and assimila-
tion to the dominant factual order existing in the 
world. If this order happens to be founded –  à 
la Adorno – on the incontestable primacy that 
instrumental reason assigns to the “principle of 
identity”, and if such primacy carries with it the 
tendential exclusion and removal of the non-iden-
tical (the Other, the different, the heterogeneous), 
then what mimesis implies, at least from a cer-
tain standpoint, is precisely a confirmation of this 
dynamic. It implies a ratification of those process-
es of negation and assimilation of alterity that are 
always operative within capitalist society.
In this sense, mimesis simply reproduces 
the structures of domination: the imperialist 
and totalitarian logics immanent in instrumen-
tal reason. The consequence is the triumph of an 
“autoreferentiality” –  the autoreferentiality of cal-
culative and objectifying thought –  that ends up 
flattening all difference, thereby suppressing any 
possible tension towards ulteriority and any pos-
sible creative and innovative instance. Hence the 
triumph of reification and estrangement, i.e. the 
triumph of “dead objectivity”, that is of “nature” 
(which is always identical to itself) with respect to 
the historicity of “culture” (which is always poten-
tially creative and capable of producing novelty).
From this point of view, the industrial capi-
talist world unilaterally imposes a notion of time 
that is essentially empty and abstract. It is an idea 
of temporality irretrievably deprived of its origi-
nal multidimensionality, its intrinsic dynamism 
and polymorphism, the product of the many dif-
ferent ways in which past, present, and future can 
be woven, layered, articulated and short-circuited. 
To speak of «chronocracy» here means to speak of 
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the triumph of a homogeneous, linear, and cumu-
lative time –  a time that is serial, automatic, and 
mechanical. Wulf observes: «Chronocracy entails 
the reduction of different actions, interactions, 
and lived experiences to the quantity of time they 
require time and again. Events are transformed 
into temporal offices (Zeitposten) that must be car-
ried out. Their qualitative difference is disregard-
ed». And again: «chronology homogenises, syn-
chronises, and functionalises the vital time of man 
from the point of view of the growth of rationality 
and effectiveness» (Wulf [1995]: 73-74). It is pre-
cisely this kind of time that mimesis, understood 
as a reproduction of the existent, helps to feed. 
This is a devitalised time, lacking any concrete 
qualitative dimension, a time that is essentially 
uniform and irreversible, based on the eternal 
return of the same, of the indefinite repetition of 
a deterministic logic. And this logic is that of the 
production of profit, of mere revenue-generating 
that subordinates all other values to it: the logic of 
consumption and the unconditional commerciali-
sation of every aspect of existence.
Therefore it is precisely in this way – with-
in the horizon of the mercantile-capitalist 
world  –  that mimesis, always understood in its 
complicity/affinity with the strategies of domina-
tion implemented by instrumental reason, «con-
tributes to the transformation into image (Verbild-
lichung) of the world and to the processes of simu-
lation» (Wulf [1995]: 70). Wulf is clearly referring 
here to Baudrillard and his key notion of “simula-
crum”. From this point of view, what mimesis fos-
ters and promotes is a process of the “aestheticisa-
tion” of the world: images, far from referring to an 
external reality, end up enclosing and rigidifying 
themselves in absolute self-referentiality, in their 
intransitivity. Thus the simulacrum-image tends to 
absorb all of reality, creating a world entirely sepa-
rate from the real one, and against which reality 
itself – as the “other of the image” – dissolves and 
vanishes.
The result is the production of a “hyperreal-
ity” – spawned by the media and new technolo-
gies – that presupposes not only the liquidation of 
every possible referent of the image, and the sub-
stitution of signs of the real for the real itself, but 
also the nullification of any possible manifestation 
and utopian function attributable to the image 
itself. Instead of revealing the Other, the simula-
crum-image neutralises it, thereby negating with 
itself the idea of culture, making it implode just as 
the dimension of the “social” implodes. In bring-
ing about the extermination of the real the simu-
lacrum destroys any alterity, any illusion, since 
illusion always entails the dimension of absence, 
of non-existent, of non-identity. Simulacrum, in 
other words, is to be understood as absolute pres-
ence, as pure surface that does not refer to any 
depth of implicit sense, and therefore as appear-
ance without apparition (in Adorno’s sense) and as 
form without content (if by “content” we mean the 
“beyond” to which the sensible givenness of the 
image refers: the “aura” of the image itself, in Ben-
jamin’s terms, i.e. the “other of the given”)4.
What is accomplished, then, is what Baudril-
lard termed the «perfect crime», alluding to the 
ability that simulacral images have of killing real-
ity – the “off-camera” of the image. Hence the dis-
solution of any distinction between reality and 
fiction, between image and reality, between what 
represents (the sign) and what is represented (the 
signified), and thus between fictum and factum. 
Images no longer “represent” the world but are 
the world, the only world possible, which does not 
tolerate alternatives. Thus, in giving space to the 
simulated world – virtual and hyper-real – mime-
sis becomes totalising and all-encompassing; it no 
longer represents a world that is different from the 
image, but results in a sort of self-illustration and 
self-presentation.
What prevails is a hypertrophic flow of imag-
es – principally, media images, and in particu-
lar “advertising” images – that prove to be empty 
of any “truth content” (in the sense that Adorno 
defines the notion in Aesthetic Theory). These are 
images that are incapable of referring to the out-
side world, and precisely because of this are no 
longer able to critically question it by taking a 
conscious and responsible position with regard to 
4 See Di Giacomo, Marchetti [2013]; Di Giacomo [2013]. 
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it. This is what happens in the case of the simu-
lacrum-image, which is characterised by the fact 
that, rather than “inaugurating a world”, it blocks 
the world in the univocity of a coercive message 
that is fixed once and for all. Thus the image is 
no longer able to refer to a “horizon of sense” that 
is open to indeterminacy and the transcendence 
of the possible. It is no longer able to elicit and 
mobilize the symbolic and productive resources 
of the imagination. On the horizon of simulation, 
the violence of an assimilation is unleashed that 
does not allow remainders, scraps, or leftovers that 
could evade the vertigo of mimetic appropriation.
From this point of view, the triumph of simu-
lation and of simulacra is the triumph of an idea 
of mimesis that is essentially idolatrous, fetish-
istic and apologetic with regard to the effective 
order of the world. It is apologetic with regard to 
what Adorno called the «administered world», the 
world dominated by the principle of identity. Thus 
Wulf can claim that simulacral images «suffocate 
the imagination and nullify the unavailability of 
the Other and the resistance of the Extraneous» 
(Wulf [1995]: 71). They dissolve the very possibil-
ity of thinking the indeterminacy of the possible, 
i.e. the “more” that exceeds the given. What simu-
lacra destroy, in other words, is precisely the tran-
scendence incorporated in the immanence of the 
given: the difference that the identical keeps with-
in itself and that makes it always transformable.
But the analysis up to this point is of only one 
of the possible dynamics attributable to mime-
sis within contemporary society. «On the other 
hand», Wulf notes, «connected with mimesis is 
also the hope of a new form of opposition against 
the processes just described, since mimesis makes 
it possible for man to get outside himself and to 
approach objects and men». From this point of 
view, it is undeniable that mimesis «contains a 
possibility of opposition to abstraction, reification, 
and the transformation into image of the world: 
mimesis opposes itself to inclusive logic and it 
perseveres in its theoretical unavailability» (Wulf 
[1995]: 71-72). Understood in this way, mimesis 
qualifies itself as the expression of an inexhausti-
ble critical and utopian potential immanent within 
it: a potential waiting to be reawakened and acti-
vated.
Mimesis holds an authentically revolutionary 
force within itself, and as such is potentially sub-
versive of the existing order. It counters the logi-
cal-conceptual, inferential, deductive, and demon-
strative way that instrumental reason puts in place 
– presupposing the dualism between subject and 
object, their separation and “head-on” opposition 
–  with a modality of thought that is fundamen-
tally other and ulterior. From this point of view, 
mimesis entails the capacity to critically question 
the dominant and ossified structures of sense, 
the categorical determinations that are held to be 
incontestable and the configurations of experi-
ence that logos assumes as something unchange-
able and intranscendable. This is due to the fact 
that mimesis, by allowing the subject to get out-
side of themselves, and by simultaneously deter-
mining the mutual reversibility of interiority and 
exteriority (of subject and object), tends to divest 
the subject of their power, escaping their cognitive 
control, which instead postulates the unity of con-
sciousness. This is what Wulf calls the «empathetic 
behavior» of mimesis (Wulf [1995]: 75).
In this perspective, mimesis implies first and 
foremost an opening to the “possibility of the pos-
sible”. It has the capacity to bring out from the 
given the “other of the given”, i.e. that “excess” of 
the non-identical that identitarian coercion tends 
to suffocate, remove and neutralise. This is one of 
the most significant theoretical features of Wulf ’s 
analysis on the concept of mimesis. Mimetic prac-
tice contains within itself the capacity to resist the 
oppressive domination of the identical, having the 
power to upend its primacy. In this way, the revo-
lutionary force of mimesis consists in its capacity 
to disclose new possibilities and imaginative con-
figurations of the existent – configurations that are 
never entirely predictable, and so are always sur-
prising.
Here, Wulf ’s theoretical debt to Adorno’s 
aesthetics is clear. To speak of the critical func-
tion of mimesis means bringing the dimension of 
artistic experience to the forefront, together with 
Adorno’s idea of the work of art as an expres-
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sion of a “determined negation” of the existent, a 
determinate negation of that “which merely is”. It 
is not surprising then that Wulf highlights how 
«for Adorno, aesthetic theory and mimesis at the 
center of it» constitute «a response to the crisis of 
critique» (Wulf [1995]: 76). From Adorno’s point 
of view, it is art – and only art –  that can counter 
the domination of the identical with the unhing-
ing and overturning power of utopia.
This is due to the fact that art is, of course, 
mimesis, but it is a mimesis not of the “given” – 
of natura naturata (the world as it is in its mere 
facticity) – but rather of natura naturans. It is, in 
other words, an imitation of that very same crea-
tive and productive power intrinsic to nature (an 
instance expressed, in an exemplary way, in the 
poetics of the artist Paul Klee). In this way, it is 
precisely in virtue of the fact that art is mime-
sis of the unlimited creative force of nature – of 
its dynamis – that it is for Adorno characterised 
by “truth content”, i.e. capable of speaking to us 
about the world. In imitating the productivity of 
physis, art points to reality, giving voice thereby to 
the tensions, dissonances, and contradictions that 
inhabit it.
Therefore, Wulf observes, if «imitation of 
nature means» for Adorno «imitation of natu-
ral beauty» (Wulf [1995]: 76), then the point that 
must be underscored here is the fact that the dis-
tinctive trait of such beauty is its “non-objectivity”, 
its indefinability and indeterminacy, its escaping 
of any possibility of explanation in logical-con-
ceptual terms. This is what artistic mimesis brings 
to light: the indefinable-indeterminate that the 
phenomenal given keeps within itself, the unrep-
resentable that representation always presuppos-
es, the invisible that the visible preserves within 
itself, that invisible without which the visible itself 
would lose its immanent force, its vital energy, 
its capacity to be interpreted in multiple different 
ways. This dimension that is never entirely repre-
sentable, and not completely visible, which artistic 
mimesis is tasked with bringing to light, coincides 
with what Adorno defines as the “more” of the 
work of art (Mehr) or its “spirit”. In fact, “spirit” 
for Adorno is the transcendence with which the 
image is brimming, and which should be under-
stood as its inexhaustible semantic productiv-
ity (see Adorno’s illuminating and decisive defini-
tion of the artistic form as «sedimented content»: 
Adorno [2009]: 8).
Thus it is precisely in virtue of the fact that 
it is already loaded with a pluristratified seman-
tic content that a work of art is mimesis of itself: 
«mimesis of works of art», writes Adorno, «is simi-
larity with themselves» (Adorno [2009]: 140). The 
work of art does not reproduce the world outside 
in a naturalistic way, but generates from within 
itself a new world that is unexpected –  a world 
that was not there before. The work of art, thus, 
is «self-referential without thereby resting on the 
coercion to the identity of the identitarian logic» 
(Wulf [1995]: 76-77). Therefore, if art is charac-
terised, as Adorno holds, by “mimetic impulses”, 
this means that it is capable of critically referring 
to reality, in the sense that it is capable of calling 
into question its presumed incontestability. But to 
be able to refer to the outside world, art must be 
“self-equivalent” and “self-sufficient” in the first 
place. It must above all “show itself ”, in the sense 
that it must recall our attention to its own sensi-
ble configuration, i.e. to the physical and material 
elements that comprise it (its “lines and colours” 
in figurative art, or its “words” in the case of a lit-
erary work). «As a model of art», Wulf explains, 
«what is required is l’art pour l’art, in which the 
reference point of art is art itself» (Wulf [1995]: 
77).
This clearly does not mean claiming that the 
work of art is exclusively self-referential (this 
would result in an empty tautology, lacking in any 
authentic cognitive function). Rather, it means 
understanding that it is precisely because it is 
self-referential – and thus precisely in virtue of its 
autonomy and independence from external reality 
– that the work of art can refer to what is beyond 
it, that is, to the (heterogeneous) world, contrib-
uting thereby to the critical re-comprehension of 
empirical reality. This is made possible by the fact 
that history’s unresolved antagonisms, its tensions 
and contradictions, are already incorporated and 
coagulated in the very physical-material structure 
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of the work. Thus the work offers itself to us as 
the always renewed and never exactly predictable 
production-representation of its own «sediment-
ed content» (cf. Di Giacomo [2009]; Di Giacomo 
[2015]).
It is in light of this eminently Adornian per-
spective that Wulf claims that mimesis «can do 
without univocity, can give life to movements 
without finality and can open space to the non-
identical, and can plead the rights of the moment 
in the face of chronocracy». This is because mime-
sis implies the capacity of giving voice to the Oth-
er – the other of the given, the other of the real 
– establishing a relationship with the world that 
is no longer «instrumental» and objectifying, i.e. 
calculative and manipulative, but rather authenti-
cally «critical». This is a relationship in which «the 
particular is defended against the universal and 
shown respect for the things and human beings» 
(Wulf [1995]: 85-86).
In this perspective, the truly utopian func-
tion that mimesis acquires on the horizon of aes-
thetic experience testifies to its irreducibility in 
the sphere of discursive and predicative knowl-
edge, i.e. its irreducibility to that knowledge that 
entails theoretical and intellectual domination 
by the subject over the object. Aesthetic experi-
ence is instead characterised by the suspension of 
the primacy that scientific knowledge attributes 
to rational-objectifying thought. This is a suspen-
sion (at least provisional and temporary) of the 
separation between subject and object that is the 
unavoidable presupposition of all of our cognitive 
strategies. Thus artistic mimesis suspends the prin-
ciple of reality itself. In the case of aesthetic expe-
rience, mimesis expresses the renewed primacy 
of the object, the primacy of the Other and the 
non-identical, the primacy, in other words, of that 
which escapes the subject’s epistemological and 
intellectual control.
As we have already noted, aesthetic experience 
above all implies the establishment of an emotive 
and affective affinity between the work of art and 
the subject that experiences it. What Wulf calls 
an «active passivity that allows people to be made 
“similar” to the work of art» (Wulf [1998]: 166) is 
established. The artist themselves, in producing 
their work, does not reproduce an external model, 
but rather gives voice to objects, and to the unex-
pressed and inexpressible depth that they hold 
within themselves. In its experience of the work of 
art, the subject “recipient”, productively stimulated 
and solicited at a pulsional-pathemic level as well 
as at a cognitive one, opens itself up to exploring 
new possibilities, ways and patterns of articulating 
experience (a process made possible by the inex-
tinguishable “anticipating function” of the “aesthet-
ic” as a “meta-functional” dimension: See Desideri 
[2009]; Desideri [2011]). As a consequence there 
is a re-configuration of the same relationship that 
unites ego and world, ego and non-ego, subject 
and object. It is precisely thanks to artistic mime-
sis, then, that the subject ends up “surrendering” 
to the sudden irruption of the Other, opening itself 
up to the possibility of seeing the world otherwise. 
What’s more, this experience leads to a radical re-
definition of the relationship that connects ration-
ality and sensibility, i.e. logos and pathos. A passage 
from the “realm of necessity” to the “realm of free-
dom” is opened up. Thus art gives voice again to 
everything that the primacy of logos had repressed, 
removed, or hidden. It gives voice to the dimen-
sion of particularity and singularity, in its irreduc-
ibility to normative and classificatory schemas.
Wulf is extremely clear on this point: in its 
experience of the work of art «the subject becomes 
‘opened by force’ and expanded. Its shaking leads 
to its partial suspension» (Wulf [1998]: 170). In 
its reception of the work of art, and thus by par-
ticipating in a «sympathetic» way in its internal 
dynamic, the subject becomes «subjugated» by the 
non-conceptual element that the work makes vis-
ible (in virtue of the fact that the work of art is an 
«insoluble enigma»). What prevails is the instance 
of involvement and sharing: shared participation 
in pathos, beyond any Cartesian dualism between 
subject and object. This has to do with a «light-
ning contact» (Wulf [1998]: 167), which, in its 
suddenness and immediacy, is not susceptible to 
explanation in logical terms (just as it is, for Witt-
genstein, in the case of «perspicuous vision»). The 
result, Wulf observes, is that «in the condensation 
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of a moment, there is an ‘aesthetic shaking’ that 
makes the ego tremble at its very foundations» 
(Wulf [1998]: 167). According to Nietzsche in the 
Birth of Tragedy, this happens thanks to the pres-
ence of the Dionysian dimension (the “intoxica-
tion”) within the aesthetic experience, presence 
implying the dissolution of the principium indi-
viduationis and thus the rupture of the continu-
ity of the subject with itself, its “dis-identification”. 
Through the aesthetic experience, in other words, 
what prevails is a dimension in which, as Rim-
baud famously remarked, «Je est un autre».
In Wulf ’s view, then, to emphasise the histor-
ical-cultural complexity and the non-obviousness 
of the notion of mimesis means to highlight the 
need to safeguard and defend the individual-
ity and singularity of the human being, within 
a world where mimesis itself is employed in an 
increasingly aberrant and destructive way. This 
perverted and simulacral use of mimesis seems 
not to concede any space to the development of 
critique, to the mobilisation of imagination, and 
to the subsequent manifestation of the unreal-
ised utopian promise, since “utopia” means the 
announcement of a possible and never apodicti-
cally guaranteed re-conciliation between life and 
sense, between ideal and real. To rethink mime-
sis means, therefore, radically rethinking human’s 
nature as human: today more than ever, it means 
championing the need for our liberation from 
homologating structures of power that, in the 
name of the identical, and in a globalized world 
dominated by processes that are increasingly per-
meated by the anesthetisation and devitalisation 
of sense, tends to oppress and violently quash the 
“different”. Thus, according to Wulf ’s reading, if 
at the base of mimesis there is always an attention 
to difference, the idea of mimesis itself implies the 
possibility of developing a «heterological thought» 
(cf. Wulf [2016]: 11-15) able to think from the per-
spective of the Other, and to recognise in the Other 
a dimension to be respected and saved, precisely 
in its being non-assimilable to the identical.
* The English translation of the passages quoted 
from Italian editions of non-Italian works are mine.
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